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Abstract 
 
In this article, I offer a brief account of some of Kierkegaard’s key concerns about 
friendship: its “preferential” nature and its being a form of self-love. Kierkegaard’s 
endorsement of the ancient idea of the friend as “second self” involves a common but 
misguided assumption: that friendship depends largely upon likeness between friends. This 
focus obscures a vitally important element, highlighted by the so-called “drawing” view of 
friendship. Once this is emphasized, we can see a significant aspect - though by no means all 
- of Kierkegaard’s worry as misplaced. However, the “drawing” view also enables us to 
begin to see what a “Kierkegaardian” friendship might look like.  
 
Søren Kierkegaard has often been viewed – wrongly - as an enemy of friendship. In Works of 
Love, it is alleged, he sets up a stark contrast between the natural loves (erotic love [Elskov] 
and friendship [Venskab]) on one hand, and love for God and neighbor on the other, 
ultimately arguing that the former should be replaced by the latter. Numerous critics, such as 
Theodor Adorno and K. E. Løgstrup, have attacked him on these grounds. Adorno claims that 
for Kierkegaard, “the differences between individual men … are, in the Christian sense, of no 
importance whatever”,1 and condemns his conception of love as “close … to callousness”.2 
Løgstrup judges Works of Love to be “a brilliantly thought out system of safeguards against 
being forced into a close relationship with other people”.3 Moreover, in three very recent 
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books on the philosophy of friendship, Kierkegaard is still presented as being friendship’s 
unequivocal enemy. Lorraine Smith Pangle, for instance, informs her reader that 
“Kierkegaard, with bold intransigence, rejects friendship as unchristian”.4 Sandra Lynch 
repeats the charge that “Kierkegaard opposes friendship … to ‘love of neighbor’”, 5 and 
claims that he “dismiss[es] friendship and [erotic] love altogether, as essentially forms of 
idolatry or self-love”.6 Mark Vernon is more polemical: he dismisses Kierkegaard’s analysis 
as “one man’s rant,” again claiming that Kierkegaard’s is “an outright rejection of friendship 
as such” and that for him “neighbor-love is wholly different from friendship.” 7 (He also 
reminds us that Kierkegaard’s name means “graveyard”, so that he can joke: “True to his 
name, Mr Kierkegaard does his best to bury friendship”.8) All three critics, in other words, 
make similar charges against Kierkegaard as did his critics of more than half a century ago, 
Adorno and Løgstrup. Kierkegaard is still commonly presented as holding either or both of 
the following views. First, since erotic love and friendship are “preferential”, rather than 
universal, they fail the test of love of the neighbor and should therefore ultimately be 
dismissed. Second, since one’s beloved or closest friend is simply one neighbor amongst 
many, one’s love for one’s partner or friend is ultimately no different from one’s love for the 
stranger. In other words, he has no room for “preferential” love at all. 
 
Now, Kierkegaard does indeed claim that “the praise of erotic love and friendship belong to 
paganism” (WL, p. 44),9 and that “Christianity has thrust erotic love and friendship from the 
throne” (ibid.). Yet he also describes erotic love as “undeniably life’s most beautiful 
happiness” and friendship as “the greatest temporal good” (WL, p. 267). So what is his 
position; what are Kierkegaard’s concerns about friendship? To what extent are they 
warranted? And if there is merit to them, what form would friendship need to take in order to 
avoid these worries? 
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In this article, I shall offer a brief account of some of Kierkegaard’s chief concerns about 
friendship. Drawing on M. Jamie Ferreira’s discussion in Love’s Grateful Striving, her 
excellent commentary on Works of Love,10 I shall show how much they are dependent upon 
the idea that friendship is a form of self-love. For reasons that will become obvious, this will 
highlight the need to consider what might be meant by the ancient idea upon which 
Kierkegaard trades, that the friend is a “second self”. I shall argue that Kierkegaard is not just 
an unequivocal enemy of friendship. However, I shall also make a qualified criticism of 
Kierkegaard, namely that an important part of his worry rests on an assumption he shares 
with numerous other writers: that friendship depends, to a significant degree, upon likeness 
between the friends. I’ll go on to argue that this focus on likeness has obscured a vitally 
important element of friendship. This element, which following Dean Cocking and Jeannette 
Kennett11 I shall call the “drawing” view of friendship, needs to be re-emphasised. Once the 
“drawing” view is on the table, I shall argue, we can see that a significant element - though 
by no means all - of Kierkegaard’s worry about friendship is misplaced. But the “drawing” 
view can also help us begin to see what a “Kierkegaardian” friendship – a kind of friendship 
of which Kierkegaard could approve – might look like.12
 
1. Friendship as preferential 
 
What, then, are Kierkegaard’s worries about friendship? First and foremost, that friendship 
(along with erotic love) is “preferential”. As Ferreira notes, Kierkegaard’s is an agapeistic 
ethic, concerned with “commanded love rather than preferential inclination”.13 In Works of 
Love, he repeatedly contrasts the Christian worldview with that of “the poet”, a figure who 
eulogizes erotic love and friendship: “The poet and Christianity are diametrically opposite in 
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their explanations. The poet idolizes inclination …; Christianity … dethrones inclination and 
sets this shall [i.e. the commanded nature of neighbor-love] in its place” (WL, p. 50). 
Kierkegaard illuminates the second love commandment – “You shall love your neighbor as 
yourself”14 – by focusing on preference and equality. Neighbor-love is “the opposite of 
preference”: whereas the concepts of the friend and the romantic beloved, by their very 
nature, distinguish my friend or beloved from those who are not my friend or beloved, 
nobody – neither stranger nor enemy - is to be excluded from the category of the neighbor; 
“the neighbor … is all people” (WL, p. 52). This connects with equality as follows. When 
Kierkegaard says that the neighbor is one who is equal before God (WL, p. 60), the most 
important contrast is not between the self and the other, since key to friendship or erotic love 
at their best is, at the very least, an equal concern for the friend or beloved as well as oneself. 
Rather, the contrast is between different “others”. Neighbor-love insists that I do not exclude 
any particular other from the scope of my love and care simply on the grounds that he or she 
is not (unlike my beloved and friends) one to whom I feel preferentially inclined. Thus, as 
Ferreira notes, “the most crucial distinction Kierkegaard makes is between nonpreferential 
love (Kjerlighed) and preferential love (Forkjerlighed) … between caring that is not 
restricted in focus and caring that is restricted”,15 and he is keen that preferential love “should 
not be the determinant of responsibility for the other”.16
 
So far, so good. But Kierkegaard connects this distinction between preferential and non-
preferential love with a more contentious set of claims. Only the neighbor, we are told, is 
truly “what thinkers call ‘the other’” (WL, p. 21). Why not the friend or beloved? Well, the 
word neighbor [Næste] is “obviously derived from ‘nearest’ [Nærmeste]; thus the neighbor is 
the person who is nearer to you than anyone else, yet not in the sense of preferential love, 
since to love someone who in the sense of preferential love is nearer than anyone else is self-
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love” (WL, p. 21, my emphasis). We shall need to look at this claim – that preferential love is 
a form of, perhaps disguised, self-love – in detail, since it is central to his argument.17 
Ferreira glosses the basic idea as follows. We need the category of the neighbor, according to 
Kierkegaard, “to safeguard the alterity of the other, to be sure that in love we allow the other 
to be more than an extension of ourself”.18 The claim is that friendship (and erotic love), 
insofar as they are preferential, are not up to this task. Why does Kierkegaard claim this? And 
is he right to do so? 
 
There are two claims here which, though connected by Kierkegaard, should perhaps be kept 
apart. The first - that friendship is preferential and that neighbor-love introduces an 
impartiality that friendship lacks - seems uncontroversial enough. (To say this, though, is not 
to deny the possibility that we might have particular duties to those we love in the preferential 
sense that we do not have to strangers.) But my focus here is on the second claim, which 
should be broken down into two constituent parts: first (claim A), that preferential love – and 
therefore friendship - is a form of self-love; and second (claim B), that in friendship the other 
is simply an extension of oneself. In what follows, I shall argue that Kierkegaard is wrong to 
infer claim B from claim A. In other words, even if he is right that friendship is a form of 
self-love, this is so in an innocuous sense, such that the worry he builds upon it – that such 
friendship therefore treats the other as simply an extension of oneself – does not follow. 
Indeed, as noted at the outset, by investigating this point, and the “drawing” view of 
friendship, we can get closer to seeing what a form of friendship of which Kierkegaard could 
approve would look like.  
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2. Friendship as self-love 
 
We need to approach this in stages. First, we need to consider the phenomenon of self-love. 
Even if it were true that friendship was a form of self-love, this would only be objectionable 
if self-love per se were objectionable. But is it? According to Kierkegaard, the answer is 
‘No’. As Ferreira emphasizes, Works of Love draws upon a distinction between selfish and 
legitimate forms of self-love,19 and what Kierkegaard is opposing is the former, not the latter. 
He notes that the second love commandment, with its “as yourself”, itself presupposes “that 
every person loves himself” (WL, p.17). Properly understood, he insists, the commandment 
insists on loving oneself “in the right way” (WL, p. 22). A distinction needs to be made, 
therefore, between “proper self-love” (WL, p. 18) – which Kierkegaard endorses, and argues 
that Christianity endorses - and “selfish self-love” (WL, p. 151), and it is only the latter that 
should be condemned. (Indeed, he even insists that loving oneself in the right way and loving 
the neighbor “fundamentally … are one and the same thing” (WL, p. 22).) According to 
Ferreira, the essence of this distinction between selfish and proper self-love is to be found in 
the kind of love of self that is “at odds with the good of the other”, and that “which both 
encompasses the good of the other and is the measure of the good of the other”.20  
 
But if there is such a thing as “proper self-love” then what matters is not merely whether 
friendship is a manifestation of self-love, but whether it is a manifestation of illegitimate, or 
selfish, self-love. And as we shall see, in his comments on friendship, Kierkegaard is 
sometimes less careful than he should be about respecting this distinction.  
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How does Kierkegaard argue for the claim that “passionate preferential love” (WL, p. 53) is a 
form of self-love? A key part of the argument seems to be to do with exclusivity:  
 
Just as self-love selfishly embraces this one and only self that makes it self-love, so also 
erotic love’s passionate preference selfishly encircles this one and only beloved, and 
friendship’s passionate preference encircles this one and only friend. For this reason the 
beloved and the friend are called, remarkably and profoundly, to be sure, the other self, 
the other I – since the neighbor is the other you, or quite precisely, the third party of 
equality. The other self, the other I. But where does self-love reside? It resides in the I, 
in the self. Would not self-love then also start loving the other I, the other self? One 
really does not need to be any great judge of human nature in order with the help of this 
clue to make discoveries about erotic love and friendship that are alarming to others and 
humiliating to oneself. The fire that is in self-love is spontaneous combustion; the I 
ignites itself by itself. But in erotic love and friendship, in the poetic sense, there is also 
spontaneous combustion. (WL, pp. 53-4)  
 
The central claim, then, seem to be something like this. Love of my beloved and my friend, 
like love of myself, excludes love for all those others who are not my beloved or friend. This 
is a trap into which love of the neighbor – who is everyone – does not fall. Moreover, the 
beloved and friend are called (“profoundly”, and therefore, presumably, truthfully) the “other 
self”. The idea here, in regard to friendship, seems to be that I see in my friend some 
reflection of myself, such that love for my friend is a kind of disguised love for myself. 
Furthermore, the reference to the neighbor as the “first you”, according to Ferreira, signals 
the need to relate to the other “as a genuine other”,21 not just as some sort of reflection of 
myself, “another me”.22 Only the neighbor, then, is “what thinkers call ‘the other’, that by 
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which the selfishness in self-love is to be tested”.23 Selfish self-love is where the other is seen 
simply as an extension of the self; in which the other’s alterity is not respected. Proper self-
love is where this alterity is respected. In a nutshell, then, Kierkegaard’s real objection is to 
the way in which we often turn the other into “another me”. 
 
All this raises at least two questions. First, the basis for the exclusivity charge in the case of 
myself is pretty obvious. Likewise in the case of “erotic love”, to anyone familiar with the 
myths of romantic love, according to which there is one person for each of us; our “soul 
mate”. (Versions of this myth are, of course, found in sources as diverse as Aristophanes’ 
speech in Plato’s Symposium and excited chatter at the water cooler about how last night’s 
date might finally be “the one”.) But we might well wonder why Kierkegaard lumps erotic 
love and friendship together here, since this idea of exclusivity seems to jar with our ordinary 
understanding of friendship. Certainly, not everyone could be my friend, but I can surely have 
more than one of them. We need to clarify, therefore, why the claim of exclusivity is made in 
the case of friendship (“this one and only friend”).  
 
Second, exactly what is meant by the idea that the friend is the “other self”? We shall need to 
investigate the origin and possible meanings of this phrase, which will enable us to consider 
whether the apparent meaning Kierkegaard attributes to it - which is what enables him to 
make the “selfishness” charge - is warranted.  
 
Let us address each of these points in turn. First, why talk of friendship in terms of 
exclusivity?  
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2.1 Friendship and exclusivity 
 
Kierkegaard’s reasons for doing so become less surprising the more we examine the 
philosophical literature on friendship. Quite prevalent in that literature is what Sandra Lynch 
describes as a “highly idealised”24 view of what friendship involves. Lynch notes that some 
of the most influential views in the philosophy of friendship, which tend to focus on 
relationships between virtuous men, view friendship at its best as being characterized by 
“complete union of feeling on all subjects”.25 For Cicero, for example, man “is ever on the 
search for that companion, whose heart’s blood he may so mingle with his own that they 
become virtually one person instead of two.”26 He defines friendship as “complete sympathy 
in all matters of importance, plus goodwill and affection”.27 Clearly, the number of people 
with whom this is possible will be small. The apotheosis of this view, however, comes in 
Montaigne, in his eulogy for his friendship with Etienne de la Boétie. In such a friendship – 
which, Montaigne claims, was “so entire and so perfect that … it is a lot if fortune can do it 
once in three centuries”28 – the two friends share a perfect harmony in world-view: “our souls 
mingle and blend with each other so completely that they efface the seam that joined them, 
and cannot find it again”.29 Of la Boétie’s death, he writes: “I was already so formed and 
accustomed to being a second self everywhere that only half of me seems alive now”.30 
Against this background, it becomes easier to see why Kierkegaard conjoins the friend with 
the lover: for instance, why he talks about “when the lover or friend is able to love only this 
one single person in the whole world” (WL, p. 55, my emphasis). Passages such as these 
from Montaigne also make it easier to see why Kierkegaard would make the following 
charge:  
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erotic love and friendship are the very peak of self-esteem, the I intoxicated in the other I. 
The more securely one I and another I join to become one I, the more this united I 
selfishly cuts itself off from everyone else. At the peak of erotic love and friendship, the 
two actually do become one self, one I. (WL, p. 56) 
 
Similarly, C. S. Lewis claims that “every real friendship is a sort of secession, even a 
rebellion”.31 How so? Since friendship is by its very nature preferential, what Lewis is 
worried about – what he calls the “pride” of friendship - involves cliquishness: the friends 
setting themselves up as an “us” defined in opposition to a “them”. This has subtle and not so 
subtle manifestations, but at its worst everyone “who is not in the circle must be shown that 
he is not in it. Indeed the Friendship may be ‘about’ almost nothing except the fact that it 
excludes.”32 What Lewis shows - more clearly, perhaps, than does Kierkegaard - is the 
danger of this particular slippery slope: “From the innocent and necessary act of excluding to 
the spirit of exclusiveness is an easy step; and thence to the degrading pleasure of 
exclusiveness”.33 At the bottom of this slope, “[t]he common vision which first brought us 
together may fade quite away. We shall be a coterie that exists for the sake of being a coterie; 
a little self-elected (and therefore absurd) aristocracy, basking in the moonshine of our 
collective self-approval”.34 And when friendship takes this form, a close relation of the kind 
of mutual intoxication we saw Kierkegaard describe above, the threat to non-preferential love 
of the neighbor is obvious. But the obvious objection is that friendship does not have to fall 
into the trap of mutual intoxication more commonly associated with a certain kind of 
romantic love. We shall briefly return to this in section 4.3. 
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2.2 The friend as “second self” 
 
Let us turn to the second issue, the idea of the friend as a “second” or “other” self. 
Kierkegaard anticipates the objection that since for “the poet” erotic love and friendship 
inhere in (selfless?) devotion to the beloved or true friend, the charge of self-love must be 
misplaced. “But how can devotion and unlimited giving of oneself be self-love?” he asks on 
the poet’s behalf. His answer: “when it is devotion to the other I, the other self” (WL, p. 54). 
As noted, then his view seems to be that erotic love and friendship are forms of self-love 
insofar as the friend is an extension of the self. But in what sense? 
 
Several philosophers - most famously Aristotle, but also Cicero, Thomas Aquinas and 
Montaigne, amongst others - describe the friend as a second or other self. (Indeed, though 
Aristotle is typically credited as the original source of this phrase, it has been suggested that it 
may go back as far as Pythagoras.35) But there is little doubt that the most famous description 
of the friend as a “second self” is that in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.36 It is important to 
note that Aristotle’s discussion is closely linked to his treatment of friendship as being rooted 
in likeness or similarity. In this context, I shall consider the charge (made recently by Lynch) 
that many philosophical accounts of friendship (including Aristotle’s) place an excessive 
focus on similarities rather than differences between friends. Not enough has been said about 
what a focus on differences would add. We can begin to fill this lacuna by arguing for the 
importance of supplementing the so-called “mirror” view of friendship derived from Aristotle 
with the “drawing” view argued for recently by Cocking and Kennett.  
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Although near the start of his discussion Aristotle mentions the idea of opposites attracting, 
shortly afterwards he asserts that “every friendship … is in accordance with some likeness”37 
and later repeats that “like is friend to like”.38 Perfect or complete friendship – as opposed to 
his two lower varieties of friendship, those of pleasure and utility – occurs between “good 
people alike in virtue”.39 Moreover, Aristotle claims that in relationships between lovers, it is 
likeness in character that is most likely to sustain a relationship once “youth fades”.40 He does 
recognise the possibility of friendships between unequals, but overall concludes that “equality 
- and likeness - is friendship, and especially the likeness of those alike in virtue”.41 Friendship 
between men with contrary needs, such as the rich and poor, is treated as mere utility 
friendship.42 Aristotle’s predominant focus in discussing friendships between unequals and 
those that are not alike is on problems that are likely to arise from these dissimilarities. And 
of people unalike in virtue, he asks:  
 
How could they be friends if they neither approved of the same things nor enjoyed and 
disliked the same things? For not even with regard to each other will these pertain, but 
without this … they cannot be friends, since they are incapable of sharing in a way of 
life.43  
 
Ceteris paribus, the picture seems to be that the more alike two people are, the better are their 
chances of a lasting friendship.44 Kierkegaard seems to buy into this general idea. He claims 
that:  
In erotic love and friendship, the two love each other by virtue of the dissimilarity or by 
virtue of the similarity that is based on dissimilarity (as when two friends love each 
other by virtue of similar customs, characters, occupations, education, etc., that is, on 
the basis of the similarity by which they are different from other people, or in which 
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they are like each other as different from other people). Therefore the two can become 
one self in a selfish sense. (WL, p. 56) 
 
But is this necessarily true? Noting the prevalence in the philosophy of friendship to 
emphasise “shared concerns, shared character traits, even complete fusion on all matters” 
Lynch argues that such conceptions of friendship fail precisely to take sufficient account of 
the “otherness” of the friend. She claims that “the friend in traditional concepts of friendship 
becomes an impossible idea – a reflection of oneself and perhaps even of one’s own 
narcissism – but never a challenge or threat; that is, never a genuine other”.45  
 
Aristotle’s focus on similarity makes it natural for him to introduce his much celebrated 
metaphor of the friend as a mirror of the self. Perhaps the clearest expression of this is in the 
Magna Moralia, where we are told:  
 
we are not able to see what we are from ourselves … as then when we wish to see our 
own face, we do so by looking into the mirror, in the same way when we wish to know 
ourselves we can obtain that knowledge by looking at our friend. For the friend is, as we 
assert, a second self. If, then, it is pleasant to know oneself, and it is not possible to know 
this without having some one else for a friend, the self-sufficing man will require 
friendship in order to know himself.46
 
The overall idea is that I can see myself in the mirror of my friend only because my friend is 
in the critical respects like me.  
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Is Aristotle guilty of Lynch’s charge of placing an excessive focus on similarity? Here 
Aristotle commentators disagree, not least because they disagree on exactly which aspect of 
the ambiguous phrase “another self” should be emphasized. Pangle puts the issue thus:  
 
As another self, is the friend loved mainly as a reflection or extension of oneself, or as 
a separate being with different qualities? Again, as another self, is he loved as 
belonging to oneself, or as a true, independent end?47  
 
I shall not attempt to resolve this aspect of Aristotle interpretation here. But to see more 
clearly the problem at issue here for the present article’s purposes, consider an important 
section of Works of Love, the deliberation “Our duty to love the people we see”. There, 
Kierkegaard insists on the duty to love people “as they are” (WL, p. 166); “to love precisely 
the person one sees” (WL, p. 173). What is at stake here is as follows:  
 
in loving the actual individual person it is important that one does not substitute an 
imaginary idea of how we think or could wish that this person should be. The one 
who does this does not love the person he sees but again something unseen, his own 
idea or something similar. (WL, p. 164)  
 
One obvious instance of this is romantic infatuation, neatly described by John Armstrong as 
“using another person as a prop in a fantasy about ourselves”.48 But there are manifestations 
of this in friendship too: not only when we reduce the friend to someone who is useful to us 
in some way, but also when we see or focus on only what we have in common with the 
friend, those aspects of ourselves that they “reflect”. The mirror can be a symbol of 
narcissism as much as of self-revelation. In all such cases, the worry is that what we are 
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loving is what Ferreira calls “the self-generated image of the other person”, which is “not the 
same as loving the actual other person at all”.49 In other words, we fail to relate to the friend 
as a genuine other. We overlook the idea that the other cannot legitimately be reduced to our 
preconceived idea of them.  
 
3. Cracking the mirror: the “drawing” view of friendship 
 
To avoid this potential problem, I suggest that what Cocking and Kennett call the “mirror” 
view of friendship derived from Aristotle needs to be complemented by what they call the 
“drawing” view. The “drawing” view, I claim, shows something about why a friendship in 
which there are important differences between friends can have a value that friendships of 
perfect unity, harmony and likeness would lack. A. W. Price suggests: “A potential aspect of 
my personality may respond to an aspect of yours not by mimicking it, but by complementing 
it. Lives are shared through exchanging as well as embracing thoughts.”50 The “drawing” 
view puts some useful flesh on the bones of this intuition. And, as mentioned earlier, it goes 
some way towards dispelling Kierkegaard’s concern that friendship might involve a form of 
illegitimate self-love.  
 
Cocking and Kennett criticise both the “mirror” view of friendship (in which what marks 
companion friendship is the great extent to which we see ourselves in the friend) and what 
they call the “secrets” view (in which companion friendship is marked by the extent to which 
we are prepared to disclose ourselves to our close friends). For their “drawing” view, 
characteristic of being a close friend of another is being “receptive to being directed and 
interpreted and so in these ways drawn by the other”.51 Their claim is that people can be 
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companion friends “precisely with respect to the ways in which they are dissimilar”,52 such as 
where each provides a useful corrective to the other. Consider the example of:  
 
two friends, one of whom is deeply cautious and the other rather reckless. These friends 
recognize the contrast between their characters, and this contrast plays a significant role 
in structuring their relationship. The cautious one knows that she could never resemble 
her friend in recklessness, yet she is attracted by this aspect of his character. The 
reckless one, while remaining quite reckless, regards with affection his friend’s caution. 
Far from being extrinsic to the friendship these dissimilar features are features in 
respect of which they are friends and which govern much of the interplay between 
them.53  
 
For Cocking and Kennett, the really significant feature of companion friendship is not 
similarity of interests, but being “responsive to our interests being directed by each other”.54  
 
To illustrate what they mean by “responsiveness” and “direction”, consider another example:  
 
my friend Iris asks me to the ballet and on account of this interest in the ballet being 
Iris’s interest I willingly accept this invitation. I may never have had any real interest in 
ballet yet I do not go begrudgingly or out of any sense of obligation. Rather I am happy 
to be moved directly by her interest in choosing to spend the evening this way; I am 
happy to attend the ballet with her when I would certainly not be interested, or in this 
way interested, if I was asked by someone else, say, for example, a new colleague or 
my elderly aunt.55  
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Of course, there could be other reasons to accept the invitation from someone other than a 
friend. As they allow, if I don’t know many people at work, the colleague’s offer might be 
tempting as a way of getting to know him better; or I may feel a sense of duty to my aunt, 
who loves ballet but doesn’t get out much. However, Cocking and Kennett’s point is that in 
these latter cases, my motivation is something other than the fact that the ballet is the other’s 
interest. In other words, the claim is that characteristic of close friendship is a willingness to 
accept such an invitation because it is the friend’s interest: “one can be disposed to be 
interested in pursuing certain activities that one otherwise would not be, simply on account of 
one’s friend”.56
 
Proponents of the “mirror” or “similarity” view might respond to this by pointing out that, in 
such a case, I might develop an interest that I never previously had: having gone along just 
because of Iris, I might find that I really enjoy the ballet, such that it starts to become a 
genuine interest of mine too. In this sense, then, I will become more like Iris: our similarity 
will increase. But while this is of course possible, Cocking and Kennett rightly claim that it 
isn’t the possibility of increased similarity that matters. It is just as likely that my latent 
interest in the ballet might not take off. If Iris never asks me again, I may do nothing to seek 
out the ballet for myself, and yet have no regrets about having shared her interest for an 
evening or two. If this is right, then what matters is not similarity - actual or potential - but 
“the distinctive kind of responsiveness to the other”.57  
 
A second key feature of Cocking and Kennett’s view of friendship is how we come to see 
ourselves through our friends’ eyes. In another of their examples, if Judy “teasingly points 
out to John how he always likes to be right” John might come to recognize and accept this as 
a feature of his character: “seeing himself through Judy’s eyes changes his view of 
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himself”.58 But suppose that, as well as the bare recognition of this, the close friend’s 
interpretation of one’s traits or foibles impacts on how that trait manifests itself:  
 
Within the friendship John’s liking to be right may become a running joke which 
structures how the friends relate to each other. John continues to insist that he is right; 
however, his insistences are now for the most part treated lightheartedly and take on a 
self-consciously ironic tone. And John may be led by Judy’s recognition and 
interpretation of his foibles to more generally take himself less seriously. Thus John’s 
character and self-conception are also, in part, drawn, or shaped by his friend’s 
interpretations of him.59  
 
Cocking and Kennett claim that having “one’s interests and attitudes directed, interpreted, 
and so drawn … is … both typical and distinctive of companion friendships, yet has been 
largely neglected in philosophical literature on the subject”.60 This addresses a key feature of 
friendship that the “secrets” and “mirror” views do not:  
It is not that I must reveal myself to, or see myself in, the other, to any great extent, but 
that, in friendship, I am distinctively receptive both to the other’s interests and to their 
way of seeing me.61
 
Noticing this has several advantages. One advantage of the “drawing” view is that it places 
centre-stage the fact that friendship is relational in a way that the “mirror” view does not. 
Second, and relatedly, I mentioned earlier that Aristotle discusses those with contrary needs, 
such as a friendship between a poor man whose wit endears him to a rich man from whom he 
hopes to gain financially (that is, a relationship in which pleasure and utility are traded). But 
some relation of contrary need is present in pretty much any friendship. What the “drawing” 
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view underlines is that even amongst those Aristotle would class as the virtuous, people’s 
characters develop in part by the ways in which they are drawn to, and by, their friends. In 
other words, this is an entirely natural part of more than just friendships of utility or pleasure. 
Third, at the end of his discussion of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle 
discusses the importance of mutual influence within friendship. “For each class of persons, 
whatever existing is for them – that for the sake of which they choose to live – is what they 
wish to engage in with their friends.”62 Each group of people spends their time on “whatever 
thing in life they are the most fond of”.63 Thus the bad influence each other for ill and the 
good influence each other for good, “since they copy each other in what they find pleasing”.64 
But only in a very minimal sense does such mutual positive influence depend upon likeness. 
Although two such friends must be, in some sense, “good”, nothing prevents their being good 
in radically different ways. For this reason, talk of “likeness” in virtue can be misleading. 
Why should we place all the emphasis on the friend’s similarity? In an influential discussion 
of Aristotle on friendship, John Cooper reads the mirror image as follows: “even an intimate 
friend remains distinct enough to be studied objectively; yet because one intuitively knows 
oneself to be fundamentally the same in character as he is, one obtains through him an 
objective view of oneself”.65 But why not, following Cocking and Kennett, suggest that it is 
“at least as plausible to suppose that one might gain self-awareness from the friend’s 
objective presentation of dissimilarity to oneself”66? To use the earlier example, it is by your 
friend’s presentation of what it is to be cautious that you see how reckless you are. In other 
words, your friends may well enhance your self-awareness and self-understanding, but there 
is no reason to suppose they necessarily do this in virtue of their likeness to you.  
 
I am suggesting, then, that Cocking and Kennett are right that having one’s interests and 
attitudes “directed, interpreted, and so drawn” is a feature of friendship that has been largely 
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overlooked in the philosophical literature on that topic. So how does this address 
Kierkegaard’s concern? We have noted that a key part of Kierkegaard’s worry about 
friendship qua preferential love is that it is typically a form of illegitimate self-love: thinking 
of the friend as a “second self” threatens to fail to respect the friend’s genuine otherness. This 
does seem to be a danger faced by the “mirror” view, and any account of friendship that 
places the primary emphasis on the way in which my friend is “like me”. But Kierkegaard 
expresses this view of friendship in large part because of his tacit assumption that I prefer my 
friends in virtue of their likeness to me. Whereas if the “drawing” view is on the mark, then 
Kierkegaard’s conclusion is too hasty. I have argued that the “mirror” or “likeness” view tells 
only part of the story. The “drawing” view – which focuses not just on ways in which we are 
different from our friends, but on ways in which we are drawn to and by, and in some cases 
changed by, the friend precisely through the ways in which we differ - does not face the 
danger in question.  
 
4. Neighbor-love in friendship 
 
By way of spelling out in more detail what the “drawing” view brings to the table, I want, in 
this final main section, to do three things. First, to suggest that just as we can “work 
outwards” from our natural love of ourselves, so we can work outwards from friendship, to 
love of the neighbor. This is perhaps not something Kierkegaard would deny, but neither is it 
something he emphasizes. The second and third points are related. One of Kierkegaard’s 
central claims is not – pace Lynch  – that preferential love needs to be eliminated, but that the 
selfishness in preferential love needs to be eliminated.67 Yet as we have seen, Kierkegaard 
tends to paint a rather unflattering portrait of friendship when it is not infused with neighbor-
love. I will suggest – the second point - that some of the distinctions Kierkegaard draws 
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between neighbor-love and such friendship are unfair, since the best forms of “pagan” 
friendship are much less graspingly self-serving than Kierkegaard’s picture implies. And yet - 
the third point - since I do recognise the importance of neighbor-love, I shall close by 
considering some important features friendship would need to have (or avoid) in order to be 
the kind of friendship of which Kierkegaard could approve. We shall see that several of these 
are features of friendship emphasized by the “drawing” view.  
 
4.1 From friendship to neighbor-love? 
 
One important implication of our discussion so far is that all genuine love should be love of a 
distinct individual.68 Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the neighbor as the “first you”, a “genuine 
other”, nicely brings out the important difference between loving someone as a particular 
individual and loving someone as an instantiation of some property. This is important 
because our talk of love of the neighbor all too easily fails to respect this division: “the 
neighbor”, far from being this particular person here, very easily becomes an instantiation of 
the general category “neighbor”. There is a crucial difference between seeing the neighbor as 
this flesh and blood individual, and seeing them as, say, “he/she who must be helped”. But to 
love at all, Kierkegaard effectively points out, involves seeing the person who is the object of 
one’s love as an irreplaceable individual, and this is just as true when that person is one’s 
neighbor as when he or she is one’s romantic beloved or friend. However, here is where 
friendship qua preferential love has an important role: not just as something that is allowed, 
but that as something that may well form an important bridge between love of self and love 
of neighbor. The point is put thus by J. H. Newman:  
by trying to love our relations and friends, by submitting to their wishes though contrary 
to our own, by bearing with their infirmities, by overcoming their occasional 
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waywardness with kindness, by dwelling on their excellences and trying to copy them, 
thus it is that we form in our hearts that root of charity which, though, small at first, 
may, like the mustard seed, at last even over-shadow the earth.69
Part of the idea here seems to be that it is easier to see the friend as an individual than it is the 
neighbor, perhaps given the potential of the latter all too easily to become an abstract 
category. And on the “drawing” view, the reason this is so is because of those aspects which 
she distinctly, and perhaps uniquely, draws out of us.70 But just as we can work outwards 
from our natural love of ourselves to love of others so, as Newman suggests, we can work 
outwards from our natural love of our friend to love of the neighbor.  
 
4.2 Friendship and the “virtues of the pagans” 
 
In the interests of fairness, we should now consider that the nobler varieties of friendship, 
even if not infused with Christian neighbor-love, can still reach greater heights than 
Kierkegaard sometimes allows. To show this in detail is beyond the scope of a single article. 
But I shall aim to illustrate this general point by briefly considering two important claims 
Kierkegaard makes about the necessity of neighbor-love: that friendship (qua preferential 
love) “contains no moral task” and that friendship is a form of being for oneself, which 
excludes self-denial. At its best, I suggest, “pagan” friendship can easily avoid these charges. 
 
4.2.1 Friendship as a “moral task” 
 
One of the ways in which Kierkegaard distinguishes Christianity’s view of love from that of 
“the poet” is as follows:  
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erotic love and friendship, as the poet understands them, contain no moral task. Erotic 
love and friendship are good fortune … It is a stroke of good fortune … to find this one 
and only friend. At most then, the task is to be properly grateful for one’s good fortune. 
But the task can never be to be obliged to find the beloved or to find this friend (WL, 
pp. 50-1).  
This seems related to the later claim that “love is qualified as a matter of conscience only 
when either God or the neighbor is the middle term, that is, not in erotic love and friendship 
as such” (WL, p. 142, my emphases). Now, the main point of the deliberation from which 
this second quote comes (“Love is a matter of conscience”) is to emphasize that Christianity 
makes every human relationship a matter of conscience: it emphasizes the obligation to love 
all, not just those to whom we feel a preferential inclination. Yet Kierkegaard claims that: 
Christianity has not changed anything in what people have previously learned about 
loving the beloved, the friend, etc., has not added a little or subtracted something, but it 
has changed everything, has changed love as a whole … This it has done by making all 
love a matter of conscience, which in relation to erotic love and friendship etc. can 
signify the cooling of passions just as much as it signifies the inwardness of the eternal 
life (WL, p. 147).  
The final point here seems to address the concern that, for “the poet”, talking of preferential 
love in terms of conscience is likely to seem like a “watering down” of the passion that 
inspires him. But isn’t Kierkegaard setting up a false dilemma by presenting an either/or 
between his imagined poet and Christianity? Why not remember a third contributor to our 
discussion: the pagan thinker? What of his view of friendship? After all, “what people have 
previously learned” about friendship has come very largely from that source.71 If we do so, I 
shall argue, we can see that even if “the poet” views friendship as containing “no moral task”, 
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and is suspicious of thinking of friendship in terms of conscience, the same is certainly not 
true of such thinkers.  
 
The danger of thinking of friendship in terms of inclination is that one can very easily give 
the impression (as Kierkegaard sometimes does) that friendship on its own is fickle, and can 
be rescued from such fickleness only by a good healthy dose of neighbor-love. But it does not 
follow from the fact that my relationship with a particular friend is one of preferential 
inclination that sustaining this relationship contains “no moral task”. And even if paganism 
has “no intimation” of neighbor-love (WL, p. 44), many a “pagan” thinker seems to have 
recognized this “moral task”. Carolinne White points out that a key feature of Pythagoras’ 
influential view of friendship, for instance, was “loyalty in all circumstances”.72 This is nicely 
illustrated by the following anecdote:  
Lysis and Euryphamos were two Pythagorean friends who happened to meet when 
Euryphamos came to worship at the temple of Juno and Lysis was just coming out of 
the temple; Lysis promised to wait outside until his friend had also worshipped the 
goddess. But when Euryphamos had finished in the temple he was so absorbed in his 
own thoughts that he forgot that Lysis was waiting for him and he left the temple by a 
different gate. Lysis, however, a paragon of fidelity, remained waiting for his friend for 
the rest of the day, that night and most of the following day until Euryphamos was 
reminded of Lysis and his promise and went back to the temple to release him.73
Whatever one makes of this – and it is far from clear that the Lysis of this anecdote would 
win a rosette in a practical wisdom contest – it seems that the one charge that could not be 
leveled against him is fickleness! The message is clear: friendship demands loyalty. 
Similarly, the alleged fickleness of inclination also contrasts with Euripides’ idea that “one of 
the most important criteria of true friendship is that it perseveres in adversity”:74 sometimes, 
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according to other stories of the time, even up to the willingness to sacrifice one’s life for 
one’s friend.75 Furthermore, the important moral dimension to pagan friendship also comes 
out in a point discussed by Cicero and Plutarch, amongst others: the problem of how to 
distinguish a flatterer from a true friend, and the related ideas, taken up by later Christian 
writers such as St Basil the Great and St Jerome, that flattery destroys friendship and that true 
friendship thus demands a degree of frankness.76
 
All this shows that even if Christian neighbor-love does introduce as a new idea that we have 
a duty to love everyone, the idea that outside Christianity friendship contained “no moral 
task”, and was not a matter of conscience, is certainly false. In other words, even if 
Kierkegaard’s poet “belongs to paganism” (WL, p. 44), there is far more to pagan friendship 
than dreamed of by this poet. We can agree with Ferreira’s interpretation that insisting that 
we should love the beloved or friend qua neighbor is “Kierkegaard’s way of reminding us 
that a man can no more take advantage of his wife [or friend], because she is his wife [or 
friend], than of another neighbor”.77 Just as we “cannot make a sex object out of our wife or 
husband”, so we cannot take advantage of our friend’s good-will or generosity, since “each 
remains a neighbor, an equal before God”.78 However, we can agree without endorsing the 
idea that this latter is the only good reason one could have for not taking advantage of a 
friend. What the category of neighbor “makes new” is the extension of the duty to love to 
everyone, but it certainly does not follow from this that neighbor-love is necessary to make 
friendship a matter of conscience, or something with a “moral task”. If Ferreira is right, 
therefore, that Kierkegaard’s real objection is to “the relationship that does not have 
conscience at its heart”,79 then that does not in and of itself rule out the best pagan 
friendships.  
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4.2.2 Friendship as “being for oneself” 
 
Consider, though, the second charge. Ferreira summarizes it as follows:  
Having a friend (or lover) is a proper love of self; loving the friend (or lover) as 
‘another self’ is legitimate, an appropriate way of being for oneself; but although it is 
proper and good, it is still a way of being for oneself and is to be distinguished from 
neighbor love, which is a way of being for another.80
 
It is this “being for oneself” element, presumably, that leads Kierkegaard to suggest that 
jealousy is present in friendship (as well as erotic love): “place as a middle term between two 
friends the neighbor, whom one shall love, and you will immediately see jealousy” (WL, p. 
54). Kierkegaard’s suggestion that jealousy might always be present in friendship (and erotic 
love), even when it doesn’t “show” itself (ibid.) comes uncomfortably close to arguing, as C. 
S. Lewis teasingly puts it (in another context), that “the absence of smoke proves that the fire 
is very carefully hidden”.81 And it is worth contrasting this claim of Kierkegaard’s with 
Lewis’s very different view of friendship as “the least jealous of loves”.82 However, in light 
of the “drawing” view, Ferreira’s gloss on what Kierkegaard is saying might prompt the 
following worry. Even on the “drawing” view, which recognizes the friend as a genuine other 
and appreciates how she helps me “grow”, the focus is still on how she helps me grow. In 
other words, the focus is still on the self: my character; virtues; etc. This may be proper self-
love, but it is still proper self-love. One can understand the temptation to claim that neighbor-
love is needed as a way of being for another. 
 
But can we really draw the distinction between friendship and neighbor-love in this way? If 
friendship is still “being for oneself”, how does this explain the pagan who is prepared to die 
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for his friend? On Kierkegaard’s picture, “Christianity’s essential form” is “self-denial” (WL, 
p. 56), but “wherever the essentially Christian is absent, the intoxication of self-esteem is at 
its peak” (ibid.): and – remember - “erotic love and friendship are the very peak of self-
esteem” (ibid.). How does such a picture explain the possibility of the self-sacrificing pagan 
friend? He has “no intimation” of neighbor-love, and yet, on the above view, this is precisely 
what he would need in order for this action to make sense. Moreover, we saw earlier that 
Kierkegaard argues that neighbor-love anyway contains a proper self-love. But if this is so, 
what needs to be shown, as before, is that the self-love involved in dying for one’s friend is of 
the “selfish” rather than the “proper” variety. I find it hard to see what convincing reasons 
Kierkegaard could give to demonstrate this. Ferreira’s earlier definition of this distinction – 
according to which, in selfish self-love, the friend is seen as simply an extension of the self; 
and in which his alterity is not respected – hardly seems adequately to describe the person 
who is prepared to die for his friend. In short, it seems that neighbor-love is not absolutely 
necessary for “being for another”. The noblest kind of pagan friendship surely does include 
“being for another” – perhaps out of gratitude and appreciation for what one’s friend has 
done for you or “drawn” out of you. It is far from obvious that this kind of self-love is either 
selfish or in any other way “improper”.  
 
4.3 A friendship based on neighbor-love? 
 
What, then, would a friendship which had neighbor-love at its heart look like? To give a full 
account of this is beyond the scope of a single article, but we can draw on Works of Love to 
make a few suggestions. First and foremost, for Kierkegaard, such a friendship would need to 
have God as “the middle term”. Whereas “worldly wisdom” holds love to be a relation 
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between persons, “Christianity teaches that love is a relationship between: a person-God-a 
person, that is, that God is the middle term” (WL, p. 107). 
 
However, Kierkegaard scholars often fail to note that this view has its precedents in early 
Christian views of friendship, such as that of Paulinus of Nola, who insists that in a Christian 
friendship, it is imperative that Christ is honoured above all else, since “a friendship not built 
on Christ is not founded on a rock”.83 Similarly, Augustine insists: “no friends are true 
friends unless you, my God, bind them fast to one another through that love which is sown in 
our hearts by the Holy Ghost”.84  
 
Ronald Green and Theresa Ellis note that a key aspect of God being the “middle term” in a 
love-relationship is that it prevents “worshipful idolatry of the beloved”.85 The equivalent to 
be avoided in friendship, perhaps, would be the kind of mutual intoxication between friends 
of which Montaigne – a precursor of Kierkegaard’s “poet”? - seems to have fallen foul.  
 
But there are other ways in which such a friendship needs to avoid being a manifestation of 
“selfish self-love”. To illustrate in more detail what this might mean, we can draw on remarks 
Kierkegaard makes in one of the most powerful deliberations in Works of Love. Once again, 
we shall see, the “drawing” view is helpful. In “Love does not seek its own”, Kierkegaard 
describes two characters who he labels “the rigid, the domineering person” (WL, pp. 270-1) 
and “small-mindedness” (WL, pp. 271-3). These illustrate recognizable human tendencies 
that, if thought of in relation to friendship, show the dangers of failing to attend to those 
elements of genuine openness to the friend as other that the drawing view emphasizes:  
The rigid, the domineering person lacks flexibility, lacks the pliability to comprehend 
others; he demands his own from everyone, wants everyone to be transformed into his 
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image, to be trimmed according to his pattern for human beings. Or he does what he 
regards as a rare degree of love, on a rare occasion he makes an exception. He seeks, so 
he says, to comprehend a particular human being, that is, in an altogether definite, 
specific – and arbitrary – way he thinks of something definite about this person and then 
insists that the other shall fulfil this idea. Whether this is exactly the other person’s 
distinctiveness or not makes no difference, because this is what the domineering person 
has supposed about him. If the rigid and domineering person cannot ever create, he 
wants at least to transform – that is, he seeks his own so that wherever he points he can 
say: See, it is my image, it is my idea, it is my will.” (WL, p. 270) 
 
In whatever sphere such a person operates, Kierkegaard continues, his nature is 
“domineeringly refusing to go out of oneself, domineeringly wanting to crush the other 
person’s distinctiveness or torment it to death” (WL, pp. 270-1). Here, painted in primary 
colours, is a picture of what friendship can decay into if it does not contain a genuine 
openness to the friend’s otherness.  
 
Similarly “smallmindedness”:  
 
The small-minded person has clung to a very specific shape and form that he calls his 
own; he seeks only that, can love only that. If the small-minded person finds this, then 
he loves. … This small-minded alliance is then praised as the highest love, as true 
friendship, as true, loyal, honest harmony. One refuses to understand that the more they 
hold together in this way, the further they distance themselves from true love … small-
mindedness itself actually imagines that its miserable invention is the truth, so that it is 
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even honest friendship and genuine sympathy to want to muddle and mess everyone 
into a likeness to oneself. (WL, pp. 272-3)  
 
In short, both these passages powerfully illustrate the dangers inherent of thinking of 
friendship only in terms of “likeness” - but also, indirectly, the value of a conception of 
friendship characterized by a genuine openness to having one’s interests and attitudes 
“directed, interpreted, and so drawn” by the friend.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this article, I have argued that while Kierkegaard is far from the unequivocal enemy of 
friendship he is still commonly presented as being, a significant part of his concern about 
friendship rests upon an excessive worry that it depends upon likeness between the friends. 
By considering the “drawing” view as an important complement to the “mirror” view of 
friendship, we not only enrich our understanding of friendship in general, but also get closer 
to seeing what it might mean to be a “Kierkegaardian” friend. In particular, the “drawing” 
view’s focus on the way in which I am distinctly responsive both to the other’s interests and 
world-view, and to their way of seeing me, shows friendship not just as something a 
Kierkegaardian should be “allowed”. Rather, it is capable of providing an important bridge 
between love of the self and love of the neighbor.86  
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